The Bell Tolls for AIPAC, the Late, Great Pro-Israel Lobbying Group
With Washington locked in partisan warfare, the organization has to choose between being liked or winning
Pro-Israel insiders explain that in speaking with donors and members, AIPAC officials went out of their way to emphasize that the sanctions blow-up simply reflected an honest disagreement with the White House about policy. But that’s not how Obama seemed to see it, or else administration officials wouldn’t have labeled those calling for more sanctions “warmongers.” This is a White House that has taken Rahm Emanuel’s rallying cry to heart: “You don’t bring a knife to a gun fight.” And AIPAC seems not to have understood that Obama saw it not simply as another Washington lobby, sometimes helpful, sometimes less so, but rather as an adversary that threatened to crash his key Middle East initiative, accomplishing one of the collective dreams of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment—historical reconciliation with the Islamic Republic.
Obama took on AIPAC not because he dislikes Israel or has a problem with the American Jewish community. Rather, it seems clear that he doesn’t like AIPAC—because he agrees with academics like Stephen Walt and U.S. policymakers like his former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his current one Chuck Hagel that the pro-Israel lobby often prevents the United States from pursuing its national interests. Given this, Obama believed, quite correctly, that AIPAC’s drive for increased sanctions on Iran ran counter to his own ideas about how to configure the Middle East to serve his own vision of America’s best interest.
As AIPAC’s President Michael Kassen and the Chairman of the Board Lee Rosenberg—a music producer who was among Obama’s earliest backers in Chicago—jointly wrote in a New York Times op-ed last week, AIPAC believes, with many others, that tough sanctions are what brought Iran to the table, and additional sanctions will strengthen the White House’s bargaining position. As they write, “diplomacy that is not backed by the threat of clear consequences poses the greatest threat to negotiations—and increases prospects for war—because it tells the Iranians they have nothing to lose by embracing an uncompromising position.”
But that interpretation flies in the face of how Obama sees the issue.
Virtually every policy the Obama Administration has pursued in the last five years shows that it believes the regime in Tehran wants a nuclear weapons program because it is fearful of being toppled. From this perspective, the last thing you want to do is put more pressure on the Iranians. Therefore, Obama has avoided feeding the regime’s paranoia and refrained from backing either the domestic opposition movement that arose in the wake of the fraudulent June 2009 elections, or the armed rebels that took on the regime’s Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad.
While the White House was willing to pay lip service to sanctions, the game changed once the administration finally secured the long-sought interim agreement with the Iranians in November. The administration’s priority from that point onward has been to protect that deal.
From the White House’s perspective, the two actors capable of threatening the agreement were Israel, through military strikes, and the domestic American pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, through sanctions legislation. Israel has proven rather easy to deter through tough talk and occasional new arms shipments. AIPAC’s failure to fight the Hagel nomination was a good sign for the White House that the lobby would fold its cards if confronted head-on. If AIPAC didn’t punish anyone when a man who prides himself on his outspoken hostility to the pro-Israel community—and especially to AIPAC—was nominated secretary of defense, then it would also be safe to cross AIPAC when sanctions legislation came up for a vote.
A second key moment came when the White House asked AIPAC to lobby on behalf of strikes against Assad after he crossed Obama’s red line on the use of chemical weapons. The problem was not simply that strikes on Syria are largely irrelevant to Israel as well as to the pro-Israel community. Rather, AIPAC’s eagerness to do the White House’s bidding simply confirmed that the lobbying group didn’t understand Obama’s larger vision. The president never wanted to strike Syria for the same reason he didn’t want to impose sanctions and threatened to veto further sanctions: Obama’s top priority is to keep Tehran at the bargaining table, and strikes on Syria might have driven the Iranians away.
When Obama decided not to strike Syria, AIPAC looked foolish. The organization banked no credit with the White House, since Obama never actually wanted to drop any bombs in the first place. Further, by supporting Syria strikes, AIPAC confirmed that its agenda was, point-by-point, the opposite of that held by the man in the White House. Having isolated AIPAC, the White House and its allies could now destroy it: In pushing for sanctions, they suggested, the Jews were taking the United States to war.
Sure, legislators will come down on AIPAC’s side when it’s cost-free. But because AIPAC cannot, or will not, punish its enemies, there’s no risk in defying the lobbying group, either. The days of the pro-Israel lobbying group striking fear into the hearts of members of Congress are over—even if a few wonky academics and overheated opinion columnists and bloggers will continue to insist that a Jewish cabal secretly controls American foreign policy. AIPAC never held such power—but the suggestion that it did was itself a form of power. Now that no one on Capitol Hill or in the White House believes that AIPAC controls anything, the lobbying group has to do some hard thinking about its own survival.
Like this article? Sign up for our Daily Digest to get Tablet Magazine’s new content in your inbox each morning.
Carter thought he was a psycho, but the man the British called ‘Terrorist No. 1’ proved himself to be a canny negotiator