J Street Opposes the Statehood Gambit

Faced with the Palestinians’ move to seek an upgrade of status at the United Nations, J Street was in a no-win situation. Support the move, and it risks being seen to be confirming everything its critics say about it—that it is really a pro-Palestinian outfit clothed in “pro-Israel, pro-peace” garb. This would also risk upending its own stated values: J Street is composed of what might be called peace process-niks, and the U.N. move totally violates the spirit of the peace process, which is that a two-state solution will be reached by direct talks and mutual concessions between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (which is actually distinct from a U.N.-recognized Palestine). But oppose the move, and it risks upsetting its base, which consists of liberal American Jews who, while in the main Zionist, are finding it harder and harder to reconcile that Zionism with a system in which the Palestinians are stateless, in no small part due to Israeli intransigence. This would also risk upending its own stated values: everybody knows the peace process is dead, and so, confronted with this nonviolent end-run around it, why shouldn’t it be supportive?

J Street chose to oppose the move, arguing, “J Street’s interest is not, however, simply the creation of a second state, but in achieving a real two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” +972’s Noam Sheizaf chastised J Street, calling theirs a “moral” mistake; the same magazine’s Dahlia Schindlin disagreed from a realpolitik standpoint, arguing that for J Street to support the move would be for it to forfeit political influence. Spencer Ackerman has a particularly smart post that assimilates these two insights and argues, again, that J Street should be supporting the move. “If you were a Palestinian, you would push a U.N. gambit as well,” he argues, I believe correctly.

But I think he’s wrong about J Street. And the reasons why go back to the very roots of J Street as well as the very roots of the U.N. statehood gambit.

To take the latter first: the statehood gambit is being cast as this symbolic step toward true sovereignty, but that actually betrays its conception. The original plan was that Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad, a brilliant, Western-trained technocrat who was so aloof from politics that he wasn’t even a member of Fatah, was going to build the institutions necessary for statehood in the West Bank; that this would take a couple years; and then the Palestinian Authority would go to the U.N., point to its already-existing state, and say, ‘Let’s make it official.’ Fayyad proceeded to do a pretty decent job—especially given the massive constraints, and minus some untoward authoritarianism here and there. But that still left the question of Gaza, the Iranian terrorist colony in the south. Reconciliation—a power-sharing deal between Fatah and Hamas that made Hamas reasonable—was supposed to be the answer. Build the West Bank, present a united and moderate front, and ask the U.N. for what you have built anyway: that was the plan. Then reconciliation collapsed due to the fundamentally incompatible visions of those two groups. And indeed, Hamas (along with Hezbollah) is against U.N. recognition of a state along the 1967 lines, since it wants a state on all the land between the river and the sea. Yet again, Israel gets off easy—it can be expansionist and not compassionate and all the rest and look like a virtuous Athenian republic compared to its worst enemies.

Which, in a way, brings us to J Street. Because the thing is this: unilateral statehood is bad for the Palestinians. It’s an uneasy conclusion to draw, but an unavoidable one. Whether it should or shouldn’t, it will most likely provoke: a sharp curtailment of U.S. aid; a renewed civil war with Hamas; the sudden anger of a (even more) disenfranchised Palestinian diaspora outside the territories; a weakening of relations with Jordan; a hardening of Israeli stubbornness; and a bunch of other things that not only are bad for average Palestinians but that are in fact worse for average Palestinians than the miserable status quo. J Street’s entire premise is that it is “pro-Israel” wherein it uses its independent judgment to define that rather than rely on the Israeli government’s determinations. If that is possible, then can’t one also be “pro-Palestinian” without supporting what the Palestinian government (one of them, anyway) supports? Moreover, politically, J Street is supposed to be President Obama’s “blocking back.” Well, Obama opposes the statehood move. Doesn’t that mean J Street needs to as well?

It could still get creative. Address the U.S. and Israeli governments, and with more than just talk. There are currently bills in Congress that would cut P.A. aid if the Palestinians ask for statehood—why not lobby to tie those bills to cuts in Israeli aid if settlements continue to expand? (I agree with the by now conventional analysis that borders, not settlements, are what matters, but it is an important message to send nonetheless.) And address the Palestinians! President Abbas is 76, possibly ailing, and has no more credibility. Push younger, moderate Palestinians, including those in Jordan, to take the reins of the movement. J Street’s position here may seem cynical, but it’s actually in keeping with their trademark earnestness. Just remember: they’re peace process-niks!

Worst Move Ever? J Street Opposes Palestinian Statehood [+972]
Why J Street’s Opposition to Palestinian U.N. Bid Is Smart [+972]
The Pincer J Street Is In [Spencer Ackerman]
Earlier: The Palestinian Statehood Bluff
Too Good to be True?
What Is Fayyadism?